UAV

US Special Operations Command Weighs Deployment of Armed Drones

After a decade of development, an experimental rotary-wing unmanned aerial vehicle may have found a customer at Special Operations Command.

The Boeing A160T Hummingbird, originally a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency program, is undergoing a series of tests at a Boeing Co. facility in Victorville, Calif. Among the demonstrations is the use of Hummingbird as a strike weapon. For the tests, the aircraft is being equipped with air-to-ground missiles, said a SOCOM spokesman.

The command could find many uses for an armed vertical-takeoff UAV while conducting counterinsurgency operations, experts said.

Special Operations has received seven Hummingbird prototypes, three of which arrived last November, said SOCOM spokesman Capt. Wes Ticer. The aircraft’s manufacturer, the Boeing Co., confirmed that the command took delivery of the UAVs under a joint SOCOM-DARPA contract for a “Special Operations long endurance demonstration.”

Since 2002, SOCOM has awarded about $90 million in contracts related to the UAV, said Ticer. The unit cost for a Hummingbird prototype is about $3.6 million.

During the test, four dummy hellfire missiles are mounted on each side of the aircraft’s “stub wings” that hold the weapons. Initial demonstrations are testing how the addition of the missiles affects the aerodynamics, said John Groenenboom, A160T program manager at Boeing Advanced Systems.

SOCOM is also considering strengthening the skin of the Hummingbird to protect it against extreme heat and cold, since the vehicle was not designed for such environments, Ticer said. The command is also adding a redundant flight control — a backup system that is now standard in most UAVs.

The Hummingbird’s design allows it to fly higher and longer than most helicopters currently in use, said Boeing officials. The craft was initially developed by Frontier Systems Inc., which was acquired by Boeing in 2004. The company received a three-year $50 million DARPA contract in 2005 to test the aircraft. The agency remains involved in the testing of various sensor payloads aboard the A160T.

The UAV is 35 feet long with a 36-foot diameter rotor. It weighs 2,500 pounds without cargo and can hold more than 2,500 pounds of fuel. It can fly at speeds of up to 195 mph. It can carry up to 1,500 pounds, Groenenboom said.

The Hummingbird can fly 18.7 straight hours, according to Boeing. Its predecessor, a gasoline-powered drone known as the A160, made its first flight in 2002 and its longest flight was approximately 12 hours, Boeing said.

Despite the tests, SOCOM remains unsure of whether it will deploy the rotorcraft, or whether it will conduct more evaluations. There are no immediate plans to acquire more Hummingbirds, and the command has no documented requirements for the system, Ticer said. Special Operations is reviewing the platform’s capabilities to determine if it can meet future needs.

“It’s all driven by budgets,” Ticer said.

Aviation analysts said the Hummingbird could be a good fit for special operations forces because of its size and ability to fly in small, tough-to-reach areas such as narrow city streets. Since it does not need a runway, it can deliver supplies to ground forces in tight urban environments, said Larry Dickerson, of Forecast International. Its size also makes it difficult for enemies to spot, he said.

The Hummingbird is also much quieter than other UAVs and can operate close to the ground, Groenenboom said. This can be a tactical advantage in a bustling city, where the UAV may not be heard amid the background noise. Stealth can help catch insurgents by surprise.

“With a helicopter, you’re going to hear it a mile away,” Dickerson said. “But a little thing like this might be able to sneak in and out of places.”

Boeing has compared the Hummingbird with the Bell 407, a four-bladed, single engine commercial helicopter. The UAV makes about 25 percent less noise than the 407, which it does by slowing the rotor to half the normal speed, Groenenboom said.

Another advantage over other UAVs is that the Hummingbird is a rotary-wing vehicle. While its fixed-wing counterparts must constantly fly in patterns, the Hummingbird can simply hover. This allows it to track ground targets more closely, Groenenboom said.

A fixed-wing UAV could lose track of a target while making a turn. Many sensors have 360-degree coverage of the ground below, but have to “reset” the video systems when certain angles are reached. If a fixed-wing drone is flying in a pattern, there is also a greater chance of losing a target behind a large building or mountain, Groenenboom said.

Users can also program the Hummingbird to fly autonomous missions. There is a Global Positioning System on the UAV, into which controllers can punch coordinates, Groenenboom said.

The drone is designed to hover at 30,000 feet, although the engine currently limits it to lower altitudes. Its commercial Pratt and Whitney 207D engine is currently certified to only fly at 20,000 feet, Groenenboom said.
Even though the altitude is limited to 20,000 feet, the Hummingbird could still be useful for delivering supplies or striking targets.

“In a mission in Afghanistan, where you’ve got mountain peaks that are at 15,000 feet, and you want to transit those, you want to stay fairly far above so you are not detected,” Groenenboom said.

Most rotorcraft cannot hover as high as the Hummingbird, Groenenboom said. Helicopter propellers require dense air to keep them aloft. The thinner the air, the more difficult it is to hover. A propeller’s diameter during flight must also be wide, relative to the vehicle’s weight.

The Hummingbird, however, is a light craft with a wide propeller diameter that enables it to reach higher altitudes, Groenenboom said. The rotor blades also do not bend, which gives them added strength, he said.

Steve Zaloga, senior analyst at the Teal Group, said the Hummingbird’s endurance could be appealing to SOCOM.

The main disadvantage of helicopter UAVs is that they cannot remain in the air as long as fixed-wing configurations. This is mainly because they require more fuel to stay aloft for a given period of time, he said.

But the Hummingbird is significantly more fuel-efficient than many of its competitors, and is the first of a string of experimental designs that are aimed at conserving fuel, Zaloga said. DARPA has been trying to invent a more fuel-conserving rotary UAV, he added.

The Hummingbird is equipped with a foliage penetrating radar antenna, so it can see through tree canopy. It can detect vehicles as well as people, Groenenboom said. The radar would be useful in counter-drug missions where smugglers hide in jungles.

Unlike the Predator and other fixed-wing UAVs that are remotely flown from U.S. bases, the Hummingbird must be operated locally. The vehicle is designed to be controlled from a ground station near the battlefield. Boeing is working with customers to develop a “common” ground station, out of which several different kinds of drones can fly, said Chris Haddox, spokesman for Boeing. Until then, the Hummingbird will operate from either a stationary trailer or a mobile van.

Deployable ground stations have been produced, but Boeing is looking into integrating these with other UAV stations that are already in use.

A team of two will operate the drone. One member flies the vehicle and the other individual controls the payload, Groenenboom said.

SOCOM is not the only customer for the Hummingbird. The aircraft has been evaluated by the Army for the Future Combat Systems program. The Navy also might be in the market. Boeing had expected to receive a $16 million contract from the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division for a “military utility assessment” and “extended user evaluation” of the Hummingbird, according to FedBizOps. But the award was cancelled earlier this month.(Matthew Rusling)

Analysis

9 factors which make a Lashkar terrorist

When Ajmal Kasab and his co-murderers were handpicked for the Mumbai terror operation nine factors were taken into consideration.

An Intelligence Bureau officer told rediff.com that these factors are abided by when a terrorist is being recruited.

Arrested terrorists, Sabahuddin and Fahim Ansari have confirmed during their interrogation that a strict procedure is followed while recruiting likely terrorists into the Lashkar-e-Tayiba.

The most important factor is commitment to the Lashkar's ideology. When the Lashkar recruits youth the latter are told they will undertake a military operation and there is absolute need to be committed to the organisation's ideology in order to succeed.

The second factor is, obviously, that the recruit is Muslim.

The third factor is the maturity of the recruit. The IB says the recruitment process begins at the age of 10. However when it comes to waging war the Lashkar ensures that the minimum age of the terrorist is at least 15. The Lashkar gives priority to hard work, mental and physical fitness over age.

The next aspect deals with sacrifice; the recruit should be willing to give up his life in order to achieve his goal.

Another important aspect which the Lashkar takes into consideration is concealing information. Talkative recruits are dumped. Likely terrorists are told they should not discuss the mission even with their closest friends or family. If a Lashkar commander discovers that the mission is being discussed, the recruit runs the risk of losing his life.

The Lashkar lays a lot of emphasis on obedience. This aspect has been picked up from the Pakistani military. During the training programmes recruits are told not to ask questions and only to follow orders.

While being recruited, the recruits undergo regular medical check-ups to establish that they are physically and mentally fit. Should any recruit not fulfill these conditions, he is dropped from the terror program.

Finally, the recruit should be patient by nature and more important, be able to endure psychological trauma.

Likely terrorists are told over and over again that they should be patient and fight till the end, and not abandon their path even if they are overwhelmed by the enemy.

Overcoming psychological trauma is most important. The terrorists are expected to remain calm when they witness bloodshed, when they are arrested or even when they are about to be overwhelmed by their adversaries.(Rediff Specials)

Book Reviews

The Amazing SAS: The Inside Story of Australia’s Special Forces

Ian McPhedran’s book recounts experiences and exploits of Australia’s SAS Regiment over the period 1999-2004 – one of the most intense operational periods for the unit since it was formed in 1957. Specifically, it has chapters on SAS operations in East Timor, Afghanistan, the 2003 Gulf War and the Tampa incident in 2001. Rather than being ‘the inside story on the SAS’ as reflected in the subtitle, it is instead a series of stories which are perhaps better described by the alternative subtitle ‘everything I have ever heard about the SAS but in no particular order’.

McPhedran is a defense correspondent for various News Limited publications. From his attendance at numerous press conferences, and through a number of interviews with key officers and some SAS soldiers, he has cobbled together a series of stories into this book. As a snapshot of SAS operations it provides a good insight for those who know little about the regiment. It will probably disappoint those with much of an understanding of defence force matters. The chapters on East Timor provide good insights into early SAS operational activities, including delicate liaison with the guerilla arm of the Fretilin resistance movement – Falantil. The incident involving the then commanding officer, Tim McOwan, his RSM and others at Tibar reflects very well on their judgment and discipline. It does much to dispel the image of the SAS as overly aggressive. Rather, SAS operations necessarily involve high levels of independent judgment, coolness under extreme pressure and battle discipline. A theme developed in the book, through this and other stories, is that judgment and thinking is valued more than brawn and grunt. The physical efforts of Special Forces operations are really required to get into a position to use your head.

The detail on the SAS involvement with the interception of the Tampa provides good background, and valuable further detail from the SAS standpoint, that has not been at all well covered in other books on the incident. Like many of the other operations described in the book, the operation provided a clear illustration of the strategic utility of the SAS – as a trusted, disciplined force that can operate under broad directives, and which can be relied upon to make sound military judgments in unforeseen or otherwise unusual circumstances.

The descriptions of operations in Afghanistan were in contrast quite disjointed. I struggled to gain a good appreciation of the military context of SAS operations in that theatre, although the descriptions of hardship in cold, high-altitude environments were vivid. Individual stories are recounted but there is little discussion and no analysis of overall strategy and operational utility. This is a disappointing aspect found throughout the book. Individual experiences are described – many of them a good read on their own – but the book lacks critical analysis at any level by the author.

The chapters describing SAS involvement in the 2003 Gulf War provide a combination of commentary from both officers and men, something lacking in some earlier chapters. The impressive tactical and operational-level impacts of the SAS during that campaign are highlighted in the general narrative and personal stories. It was also pleasing to see the author cover the strategic impact of SAS operations through daring and controlled aggression – and the flexibility of an SAS squadron operating with its headquarters also deployed in the field.

Interestingly, for a book authored by a journalist, it is quite poorly edited. The author’s expression is also at times poor and the frequent repetition detracts from the book’s flow. The lack of a logical sequence also had me struggling from story to story. While broadly factual overall, there are easily avoidable errors in the research. For example, Somalia in 1994 not Suai in 1999 was the first occasion the Australian SAS fired a shot in anger since Vietnam. Finally, while McPhedran is clearly sympathetic to the SAS and impressed with their capability, he has obviously failed to grasp the need-to-know principle. He places greater priority on telling the world how much he does know (or thinks he knows), rather than exercising the due discretion required. I thought it particularly inappropriate that the book includes identifiable references to the families of SAS members.

I know all the officers and many of the soldiers quoted in this book. Many are my friends. While I am pleased for them and their families that the exploits of the SAS Regiment during these campaigns has been publicly recorded, I am disappointed the book is not better written from both a stylistic and an analytical viewpoint. But perhaps the author could only work with the information he was given and there were limited opportunities to gain a more holistic view. Still, the book is worth reading to get a flavor of SAS operations, the character of the regiment and the ingredient that makes the SAS so successful – the officers and men who make up the unit.

Ian McPhedran, ‘The Amazing SAS: The Inside Story of Australia’s Special Forces’, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2005.

Technology

Sniper Assistant 'App' For IPhone

The Bulletflight ballistics calculator predicts the trajectory of a bullet, and has been made available as an application for Apple IPod/IPhone devices. The application takes into account the variables of altitude, wind, distance, temperature, and so on.
Knight's Armament (that company that is well known for the wonderful rifle/rail systems) commissioned and sells the app through Apple's Itune app store for $11.99.
Specifics on the app itself can be found here: http://www.knightarmco.com/bulletflight/index.htm

INTERPOL

Interpol issues alert for 85 terror suspects

PARIS -- Interpol put out an international security alert Tuesday for 85 alleged terrorists suspected of plotting attacks against Saudi Arabia in the largest single batch of wanted notices ever sent to police agencies worldwide.

Saudi authorities asked Interpol for help in locating the 83 Saudis and two Yemenis after releasing a new most-wanted list last week. Documents profiling the suspects show that they include a man married to Osama bin Laden's daughter and another who was suspected of involvement in a plot to kill the U.S. ambassador in Yemen.

Interpol, based in Lyon, France, said the men are all wanted on terrorism-related charges, including links to al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

It was the first time the international police agency has issued a single so-called orange notice for so many suspects at once. An orange notice is sent to all of Interpol's 187 member countries and includes identifying details of each suspect to aid in arrests.

Interpol did not release details about the suspects.

Documents profiling the men obtained by The Associated Press in Saudi Arabia show that many are suspected of taking part in planning attacks targeting oil or security installations or provided al-Qaida members with weapons and money. All are believed to be hiding abroad, many in neighboring Yemen.

Saudi authorities believe the men are active members of al-Qaida or local offshoots and are trying to re-establish the terror network in Saudi Arabia after a series of harsh crackdowns in past years. They include 11 who have been released from the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay.

Al-Qaida has not carried out a major attack in Saudi Arabia since February 2006, when suicide bombers tried but failed to attack an oil facility at the Abqaiq complex, the world's largest oil processing facility, in eastern Saudi Arabia.

Interpol Secretary-General Ronald K. Noble said Saudi authorities consider the men "a security concern not only for Saudi Arabia and the entire region but for the world as a whole."

Interpol lists more than 13,000 suspected terrorists in its databases.

(Copyright 2009 by The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved)

Mission Story

The Hijacking of Flight GA 206

28 March 1981

On 28th March 1981, Garuda Indonesian Airlines Flight GA 206, by DC-9 “Woyla” was en route from Palembang to Medan, a domestic flight between two Indonesian cities. The plane had flown from Jakarta at 0800, was in transit to Palembang, and from there was scheduled to make the trip to its final destination at Medan, arrival time estimated 1055.

Once in the air, however, two passengers got up from their seats. One went to the cockpit while the other stood in the aisle. Moments later, by 1010, Woyla was completely under the control of five hijackers, all armed. The hijacker in the cockpit ordered the pilot to fly the plane to Colombo, Sri Lanka, but the pilot said that the fuel wouldn't be sufficient to travel that distance. Then the plane was then flown to Penang, Malaysia.

The terrorists are from Jihad Commando group, Moslem radicals that responsible for raids on police stations, military bases, and various acts of sabotage in Indonesia from 1977-1981. In the midday, Indonesian government went on red alert. Indonesia had never dealt with serious hijacking before. The first case ever was in 1974, when a desperate Marine hijacked a domestic flight for money, then he was killed by the pilot himself. In an effort to familiarize themselves with the layout of the aircraft, later that evening the newly created Indonesian's Special Force, Kopasandha (now-Kopassus) borrowed another DC-9 from Garuda Airlines and used it for combat training.

The plan itself wasn't good. Woyla has left Malaysia after refueling, bound to Don Muang, Thailand. An old female passenger was allowed to go in Malaysia. The terrorists have declared their demand: The release of Jihad Commandos that have been imprisoned by Indonesian government, and US $ 1.5 million. They also demand a plane is prepared for the released prisoners, to an yet unspecified destination. They have bomb set on the plane. Things get harder for the Kopasandha commander. He suspects that the plane will be flown to a state in Middle East. But as the plane has been relocated from Malaysia, the step was going further for him. Also, US Ambassador has called him and told him that US really counts on him to the safety of American citizens abroad the flight. In 2100, 29th March, 35 members of Kopasandha left Indonesia in a DC-10, all wearing civilian clothes.

Thailand government itself didn't agree much on Indonesian choice to use military force. They preferred negotiation, the same way that ended the taking of Israeli embassy in Bangkok by Black September terrorists back in 1972. Finally, they let the military way, considering that the owner of the aircraft is Indonesian government, and all the terrorists are Indonesian nationals, from a Moslem extremist group. The CIA chief of station in Thailand met later with Kopasandha to lend them flak jackets and breaching kits for the assault.

31 March 1981

0230, an American journalist on the top of a bus surrounding Don Muang, woke his comrades, international journalists from Indonesia, US, Thailand, Japan, Singapore, West Germany, France, and Australia. 500 meters from Woyla, armed soldiers walked silently in the bushes. The plan was, blue team and red team would climb the wings then wait at the side doors. The windows of the plane have been blinded. While green team will breach the rear door, all will enter at the same time at the go-code.

0243, Thailand commando team moves in, waiting on the runway to prevent the possibility of escaping terrorists.

0243, The go-code is given. The three teams enter, but not at the same time. Green team entered first, only to find that a terrorist was alert in the rear side of the plane. The terrorist fired, striking one assault team member in an area of his stomach unprotected by his flak jacket. The hijacker then killed himself. Blue team and red team then entered, shot two others terrorists on sight, as the passengers ducked and closed their eyes. The commando team shouted to the passengers, telling them to rush out. A hijacker, with grenade in hand, also ran outside and tried to throw it. But other passengers pinpointed him and the commando team finished him before the front door. The last terrorist was killed outside the plane.

0245, With the area secure, paramedics immediately rushed to the plane to try and save the pilot who had accidentally been shot by a terrorist during the raid.

However, US reporters would soon become distracted from this event as reports of the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan began to filter in.

All terrorists aboard were killed, as were the pilot of Woyla and the anti-terrorist team member. The Asian Wall Street Journal, as well as Asian and European papers praised the good work by Indonesian Special Force. Indonesian intelligence itself later declared that the main goal of the terrorists' organization was to throw the government and to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. It is suspected that they have asked for support to Islamic Republic of Iran, as the leader of the hijacker (the one that killed the CT member then shot himself) has written a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini, behalf of the Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Council, asking for aid from Iran. (Mario Rustan)

Colt Weapon System

M4 5.56mm Carbine

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The M4 Carbine is an extremely accurate and effective weapon under all practical field applications. It is a favorite with both first line infantry operations as well as special forces, unit commanders and vehicle crews. Available with a Safe/Semi/Full Auto 3-position selector (model R0977) the M4 Carbine is today’s weapon of choice. The M4 Carbine features a redesigned 4-position sliding buttstock allowing it to adapt to soldiers of different sizes and physical characteristics as well as various firing positions or clothing variations. Almost all mechanical components are interchangeable with those of the M16 rifle, ensuring quality, and commonality of parts and reduced maintenance costs.

The M4 Carbine barrel is designed to accept the M203 Grenade Launcher which can easily be assembled to the carbine offering the user both point and area firing capabilities. Also, all US and NATO rifle grenades can be fired without any supplementary equipment

CALIBER 5.56X45mm NATO (.223 Rem)
WEIGHT WITHOUT MAG 5.9 lb (2.68 kg)
EMPTY 30 ROUND MAG 0.25 lb (0.11 kg)
LOADED 30 ROUND MAG 1.0 lb (0.45 kg)
OVERALL LENGTH Stock Retracted 33 in (84 cm) 29.8 in (76 cm)
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Mumbai Crisis

Mumbai attackers trained by Special Forces: Russian expert

MOSCOW: A top Russian counter-terrorism expert on Sunday underlined that the Mumbai attackers were not "ordinary terrorists" and were probably trained by the special operations forces set up in Pakistan by the US intelligence prior to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

"The handwriting and character of the Mumbai events demonstrates that they were not ordinary terrorists," said Vladimir Klyukin, an Afghan war veteran.

"Behind this terrorist attack there are 'Green Flag' special operations forces, which were created by the Americans in Pakistan, just an year before the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in the initial period were under full US control," stressed Klyukin, a veteran of the special "Vympel" commando group of the former Soviet KGB.

He said for such guerrilla operations at least two-three years of preparatory work with the involvement of experienced instructors is required.

Klyukin did not rule out that the Mumbai attackers could have taken part in similar attacks in other regions.

"People from the streets, without any planning and training are simply not able to hold four big complexes in a city so long," Soviet special services veteran was quoted as saying by largest Russian Interfax news agency.

He also presumed that there were at least 50 attackers given the geography and scale of the strikes.

Klyukin lauded the "right" decision of the Indian authorities not to succumb to terrorist demands.

He, however, regretted that India lacks special anti-terror units similar to the Russian, Israeli, British or German.

Nearly 200 people were killed in the multiple terror attacks in the Indian financial capital, hitting five-star hotels and other targets frequented by Westerners.